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Abstract
We analyze firms’ incentives to cluster in an industrial district to benefit from reciprocaltechnology spillovers. A simple model of cumulative innovation is presented, where technology
spillovers arise endogenously through labor mobility. It is shown that firms’ incentives to cluster arethe strongest when the following three conditions are met: (1) the growth potential of an industry is
high; (2) competition in the product market is relatively soft; (3) the probability of a single firm to
develop an innovation is neither very high nor very low. Trade secret protection based on punitive
damages is, except in some extreme cases, beneficial for firms’ profits, stimulates clustering, and is
not an impediment to technology spillovers.
JEL classification: J3; K2; L1; O32; O34
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1. Introduction
During the 1980s and the 1990s, Silicon Valley has been the prototypical example of a
successful industrial district. In the mid-1990s, it was home to 20% of the world’s largest
technology companies (Businessweek, 25 August 1997), and the mean income was 50%
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from complete.5 The first obstacle facing any firm alleging a misappropriation of a trade
secret is to demonstrate that a trade secret exists. This often proves to be difficult as the
A. Fosfuri, T. Rønde / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 22 (2004) 45 65 47information constituting a trade secret is unknown to the public and may not be easily
defined.6 The alleging firm’s position is particularly weak in cases concerning employees
defecting to competitors. Courts are concerned about employees’ freedom to seek new job
opportunities. They are thus reluctant to prevent an employee from working for a
competitor by granting injunctive relief or enforcing a very restrictive non-compete
covenant. Hyde and Gilson argue that trade secret protection is particularly weak in
California and that this explains the high labor turnover in Silicon Valley. However, both the
cultural and the legal explanations of the high labor turnover seem to forget that firms have
monetary instruments to keep their employees: they might simply pay a higher wage in
order to avoid turnover and constrain the outward knowledge flow.
In this paper, we build a simple model that offers an economic rationale to the empirical
evidence discussed above. An entrepreneur (a firm) needs a researcher (a worker) to run his
R&D department. An important ingredient of our model is that knowledge and innovation
are cumulative. The R&D activity gives rise to knowledge, which is valuable both for
directly commercializing a product (first generation) and for being the basis for a new and
better version of the product (second generation). We follow Pakes and Nitzan (1983) and
endogenize technology spillovers through labor mobility. After having successfully
developed the first-generation product, the worker can move to a rival firm, enabling it
to use the knowledge embedded in the product. The movement of the worker contributes to
make the knowledge widespread at the industry level, thereby rising the likelihood that the
second-generation product will be developed. We explicitly consider the competition for
the services of the worker, and technology spillovers arise only if the rival firm is willing to
offer a higher wage to the worker than the current employer.
We then move a step backwards in the game tree and allow firms to choose locations.
Each firm can either decide to locate in a separate region or to ‘cluster’ in the same area as
the rival. In our model, technology spillovers are the only reason for firms to cluster. Put
differently, technology spillovers are a necessary condition for firms to cluster. However,
technology spillovers are not a sufficient condition, because workers earn a higher expected
wage when firms locate together. In equilibrium, firms cluster only if the expected benefits
from technology spillovers outweigh the additional wage bill.
We identify three conditions that increase the benefits from technology spillovers and
strengthen firms’ incentives to cluster. First, product market competition is soft, so the
additional competition due to technology spillovers does not dissipate too much rent.
Second, the probability of a single firm to develop the second-generation product is neither
very small nor very large. Third, the value of the second-generation product is high relative
5 The discussion here is based on trade secret protection in the US under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (see,
e.g., Choate et al., 1987; Budden, 1996). The laws of trade secrets build on the same principles in most countries,
so the problems sketched here are also present outside the US.
6 Some trade secrets such as a formula or a customer list can be easily identified. However, many tradesecrets have an element of tacit knowledge, and it is hard to draw the line between the general knowledge that an
employee has received through his education, background, and work experience, and the specific knowledge that
he has received from an employer and that one could classify as a trade secret.
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to the first. These last two conditions ensure that the benefits of having one more firm trying
to develop the second-generation product are high.
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decision to cluster and the intensity of labor mobility. We show that a system of trade secret
protection based on punitive damages, except in some extreme cases, increases profits,
stimulates clustering, and is not an impediment to technology spillovers. Trade secret
protection that prevents technology spillovers from arising (post-employment covenants
not to compete, injunctive relief, or excessive damages) does not induce clustering and
reduces profits.
Technology spillovers and high-tech clusters have received attention both from
industrial economists and economic geographers. Katz (1986), Kamien et al. (1992), and
Choi (1993) have studied the relationship between technology spillovers and research joint
ventures (RJVs). An RJVallows firms to coordinate their R&D investments and to share the
R&D outcomes. There is, therefore, a parallelism between RJVs and high-tech clusters.
Indeed, joining a cluster can be seen as a way for firms to share knowledge in circumstances
in which more efficient contractual arrangements such as licensing, RJVs, or patent pooling
are not available. An important difference with respect to our work is that the literature on
RJVs does not elucidate the mechanism through which such spillovers take place and,
typically, treats technology spillovers as exogenous.7
More recently, some authors have recognized that an important source of technology
spillovers is labor mobility. Following Pakes and Nitzan (1983), this literature has treated
technology spillovers as endogenous: firms actively try to prevent workers from leaving
and to ‘poach’ workers from competitors. In this vein, Fosfuri et al. (2001) analyze
technology spillovers due to workers’ mobility from multinationals to local firms, and
Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003) study how the presence of endogenous spillovers affects
the incentives to invest in cost-reducing innovations. Related to this, there has been some
work on how firms can design their organization in order to avoid that valuable knowledge
spills over to competitors through workers’ mobility. See, e.g., Rajan and Zingales (2001),
Rønde (2001), and Zabojnik (2002).
There are two recent papers that study the functioning of industrial clusters when
technology spillovers arise through labor mobility, but focus on issues complementary to
the ones analyzed in this paper. Cooper (2001) looks at firms’ and workers’ investment in
R&D and human capital, respectively, an aspect that we discuss briefly in an extension.
However, he abstracts from the strategic interaction between the labor and the product
markets, which plays a crucial role in our model, and does not consider the location choice
of firms. Combes and Duranton (2001) use, as we do, the model introduced by Pakes and
Nitzan (1983) as a building block. There are, however, a number of differences between
their and our work. Most importantly, we focus on cumulative innovations and trade secret
laws, whereas Combes and Duranton consider the interaction between product differenti-
ation and the ‘absorptive capacity’ of firms.
Our paper is also related to the literature on patents and cumulative R&D (Scotchmer,
1991). This literature has primarily looked at the role of patents in providing adequate
7 Mai and Peng (1999) use such ‘black-box’ type of spillovers to study firms’ incentives to cluster.3
incentives to sequential innovators. Little attention has been placed on the importance of
technology spillovers. A recent exception is Bessen and Maskin (2000), who present a
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protection leads to more or to less innovation. The analysis of patent protection is different
from that of trade secret protection,8 but Bessen and Maskin also reach the conclusion that
very strong protection of intellectual property may slow down innovation and reduce
overall welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the basic model,
and Section 3 derives the theoretical relationship between technology spillovers, labor
mobility and clustering. Section 4 discusses some extensions of our basic model, and
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The model2.1. The first periodConsider a world where there are two periods and two entrepreneurs each running a firm.
Denote the two firms as A and B. At the beginning of the game, firms must choose
irrevocably their locations. The firms can either decide to locate in separate regions or to
cluster in the same area. The firms have no marketable product at this stage. After locating,
each firm hires a researcher (a worker) to develop a product. The worker is hired from a
pool of identical workers. Workers have a reservation wage w¯, which is normalized to zero.
Workers are wealth constrained and cannot borrow on the financial markets, so the first-
period wage must be nonnegative.
We assume that each firm undertakes a costless R&D project that has an exogenous
probability s of succeeding. We relax this assumption in Section 4 where the
probability of success is endogenized. The successes of the two firms’ R&D projects
are independently distributed. A successful project leads to an innovation that we
denote as innovation 1. With probability (1 s) the project is unsuccessful, and the
firm stays out of the market in the first period. Once the innovation process is resolved,
production takes place, the good is sold, and first-period profits are realized. The value
of exploiting innovation 1 as a monopolist is p1. If both firms develop the innovation,
the duopoly profits are ap1. The parameter a measures the degree of product market
competition, with lower values of a associated with tougher competition. We assume
that aa[0,1/2].
2.2. The second period
In the second period, firms have the possibility to develop a new and better version
of the product (innovation 2), but only if they have access to the knowledge created
8 Most notably, a patent assigns an exclusive right to its holder, whereas trade secret laws do not protect
against independent, although identical, innovations by other firms.4
when developing innovation 1. R&D is therefore cumulative. This knowledge also
allows firms to exploit innovation 1 in the second period if they fail to develop
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is s (conditional on having the necessary knowledge) and is independently distributed
across firms. Innovation 2 is drastic with respect to innovation 1. Hence, a firm endowed
with innovation 2 earns monopoly profits both when the rival has innovation 1 and
when it has no product at all. Monopoly profits of exploiting innovation 2 are p2,
whereas duopoly profits are ap2.
We make two simplifying assumptions concerning the knowledge created in the first
period. First, after developing innovation 1, the entrepreneur and the worker have all the
relevant information. Therefore, if the worker employed in the first period leaves, the
entrepreneur can instruct another worker and continue the R&D activity uninterruptedly.
Second, if the two firms have experienced the same R&D outcome in the first period (either
success or failure), they have the same knowledge and have no gains from acquiring each
other’s knowledge. Notice that a worker possesses valuable knowledge if he has worked for
the only successful firm in period 1. In all other states of the world, workers are simply paid
the reservation wage.
The outcome of the second period depends on the results of the R&D activities in the
first period. We will therefore describe the game in the second period for the different
possible states of the world.
No firm has developed innovation 1. The firms start all over again, and everything is as
in period 1 except that firms do not choose location.
Both firms have developed innovation 1. The two firms aim at developing innovation 2.
A firm earns p2 if it is the only one to develop innovation 2, whereas the rival earns 0. The
firms earn ap2 if they both succeed and ap1 if they both fail.
Only one firm has developed innovation 1. Assume that firm A has developed
innovation 1 and firm B has not (the other case is analogous). Firm B would like to hire
the employee of firm A to acquire the knowledge necessary to develop innovation 2.9 We
assume that this is only feasible when firms are located in the same region, for instance,
because relocation costs or informational costs of identifying the ‘right’ worker are large
across regions. This assumption is relaxed in Section 4. We need to consider the two
subgames where the firms are in the same region and in separate regions.
Suppose that the firms have chosen separate locations. Firm A tries to develop
innovation 2 and firm B innovation 1. Firm A drives firm B out of the market if it is
successful and earns p2. If firm A fails, but firm B succeeds, both firms earn ap1. Finally, if
both firms fail, firm A earns p1 and firm B earns 0.
Suppose instead that the firms have chosen a joint location. At the beginning of the
second period, firm B tries to hire the worker that was employed by firm A in the first
period. Obviously, firm Awould like to retain the worker in order to have a head start in the
second period and can take different legal actions to achieve this goal. Foreseeing that the
worker may leave, firm A can include a covenant not to compete in the worker’s
9 We disregard licensing contracts, as it is very difficult to license nonpatented information (Arrow, 1962;
Cheung, 1982).5
Fig. 1. An illustration of the game with all the different states of the world and the choices of the firms.
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employment contract that prevents him from working for firm B in the second period.
Another possibility is to sue firm B after the worker has left. The relative effectiveness of
A. Fosfuri, T. Rønde / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 22 (2004) 45 6552these measures depends on the jurisdiction and the nature of the innovation (see the
Introduction). We consider primarily the possibility to go to court and assume that if a
worker brings valuable knowledge to a rival, the hiring firm has to pay (expected) damages
of D, Da[0, l].10 This reflects the situation in Silicon Valley where covenants not to
compete are very seldom enforced (see Gilson, 1999).11
We model the competition for the worker in the following way. Each firm
simultaneously and independently makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the worker. The
firm who offers more hires the worker and pays the wage that it has offered. Put
differently, the hiring process works like a first-price auction. If both firms offer the
same wage, we assume that the firm whose valuation of the worker is highest hires him.
The tie-breaking rule ensures that an equilibrium in pure strategies exists. We will focus
on the equilibrium in which the firm hiring the worker pays exactly the rival’s
valuation.12 Each firm’s valuation of the worker depends on its outside options that
we will derive later.
If firm A retains the worker, the game continues as in the subgame where the firms are
in separate locations. If firm B hires the worker, the game continues as in the state where
both firms have developed innovation 1 in the first period.
Fig. 1 illustrates the game with all the possible states of the world and the actions
taken.
3. Solving the modelWe are now ready to solve the game. Let us start by computing each firm’s expected
profits if they locate in separate regions. Notice that in this case, there is no possibility oflabor mobility, so technology spillovers cannot arise. We proceed by backward
induction.
Let Vij be firm i’s expected profits before the second innovation round is resolved. Vij is
a function of the firm’s knowledge (subscript i) and the rival’s knowledge (subscript j),
10 Notice that if expected damages are sufficiently high, this is equivalent to strong enforcement of covenants
not to compete, because an outside firm would never find it profitable to obtain trade secrets by poaching aworker. We discuss briefly the case of covenants not to compete in Section 4.
11 Even if the courts of California are reluctant to enforce trade secret laws in cases that involve
misappropriation by former employees, there have been several law suits that made headlines in the business
press: in 1994; Vermont Microsystems was awarded $25.5 million in damages, because Autodesk was found to
have used trade secrets brought by a former employee; in 2000; Intel accused Broadcom for ‘poaching’ key
employees to acquire its communications-chip technology and sued for damages and injunctive relief (the case
was settled out of court); in 2001, Avant was ordered to pay $182 million plus interest to Cadence Design
Systems for having marketed products partly based on source code obtained from a former employee.
12 We disregard equilibria where both firms offer a wage between the lowest and the highest valuation of the
worker (and where the firm with the highest valuation hires him), since in these equilibria the firm with the lowest
valuation is playing a weakly dominated strategy.
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with i, ja{0,1} where 1 indicates that the firm in question possesses the knowledge of the
first innovation, and 0 indicates that it does not. There are four possible states of nature:
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the knowledge. Expected profits are
V11 ¼ s2ap2 þ sð1 sÞp2 þ ð1 sÞ2ap1;
V00 ¼ s2ap1 þ sð1 sÞp1;
V10 ¼ sp2 þ ð1 sÞsap1 þ ð1 sÞ2p1;
V01 ¼ sð1 sÞap1; ð1Þ
where V10>V11>V00>V01 as long as p2>p1.
The per firm expected profits at time t = 0 if firms locate separately are therefore:
Y
sep
¼ s2½ap1 þ V11 þ sð1 sÞ½p1 þ V10 þ V01 þ ð1 sÞ2V00: ð2Þ
We now focus on the other branch of the game tree in which firms decide to cluster at
t = 0. As above, we proceed by backward induction.
Let us consider the hiring process. Recall that this plays a role only in asymmetric
situations. For simplicity of exposition, let us say that firm A has got innovation 1 and firm
B has not. Firm Awill earn V10 if it keeps the worker, and V11 +D if it loses him to firm B,
since it will receive damages. Therefore, firm A’s valuation of the worker is
vA=Max{V10V11D,0}. Firm B will earn V11D if it is successful in poaching the
worker, and V01 if it is not. Firm B’s valuation of the worker is vB =Max{V11DV01,0}.
We focus primarily on the case where for both firms the expected damages do not exceed
the value of the worker.
A.1. DVMin{V11V01,V10V11} (trade secret protection is not excessive).
Two situations are possible: either vAzvB, and firm A keeps the worker by
paying him wns =V11DV01; or vA < vB, and firm B hires the worker by paying
him ws =V10V11D. In the latter case, technology spillovers arise since the knowledge
becomes widespread across the industry. Notice that the worker in both cases will be paid
more than the wage in the pool. A joint location increases the expected wage of the workers,
because firms compete for the knowledge that the workers have accumulated in their prior
jobs. However, stronger trade secret protection acts in the opposite direction by reducing the
workers’ expected wage.
The following result summarizes the outcome of the hiring process:
Lemma 1. Suppose that the firms are in a joint location, and only one firm has developed
innovation 1 in the first period. Technology spillovers arise if and only if
2V11 > V10 þ V01: ð3Þ
8
Proof. The worker moves if vA < vB. After substituting, this gives the condition reported
above. 5
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Notice that the strength of trade secret protection does not affect the technology spillover
condition. As long as trade secret protection is not excessive, it increases the profits of the
innovating firm by D and decreases the wage of the worker by the same amount, but it does
not prevent technology spillovers from occurring.
One can rewrite condition (3) as follows:
DEðp1Þ þ DEðp2Þ > 0 ð4Þ
where DE(p1) = [(1 s)2(1 2a) + 2sa(1 s)]p1 and DE(p2)=[s(1 s) s2(1 2a)]p2
are the changes in the expected industry profits accruing from innovation 1 and innovation
2, respectively, due to technology spillovers.
First, notice that DE(p1) < 0 since technology spillovers both increase the probability that
innovation 1 will be replaced by innovation 2 and the probability that firms will end up
competing with the first-generation product. In turn, this implies that
Remark 1. A necessary condition for technology spillovers to arise is DE(p2)>0, i.e.,
(1 a)s < 1/2.
In words, the probability to develop an innovation must be sufficiently low and/or
competition sufficiently soft.
It is also useful to state the following remark:
Remark 2. A necessary condition for technology spillovers to arise is p2>p1.
Proof. Let p2 = p1 (if p2 < p1 the argument holds a fortiori). Then Eq. (3) implies that 1 2
(1 a)s>(1 s)2(1 2a)/s + 2a(1 s). After some simplifications, one obtains that
(1 s)3s>1, a contradiction. 5
One can decompose DE(p2) in two parts, where s(1 s)p2>0 captures the increase in
expected industry profits due to an overall higher probability that innovation 2 is developed
and  s2(1 2a)p2 < 0 is the reduction in expected industry profits due to increased
competition (i.e., higher probability of a duopoly).
Summarizing, when the worker moves from firm A to firm B, two opposing effects
occur to expected industry profits: (1) a positive effect due to the overall higher probability
that the more valuable, second-generation product is developed; (2) a negative effect since
firms will be more likely to compete with either the first- or the second-generation
products.
The technology spillover condition, Eq. (3), is a function of a, s, and p2/p1. We will refer
to p2/p1 as the ‘growth potential’ of the industry, because it measures how profitable the
second innovation is relative to the first. The following remark summarizes the comparative
statics with respect to these parameters.
Remark 3. Technology spillovers arise for a larger parameter space if the growth potential
of the industry is high, competition is soft, and the probability of innovating is
intermediate.
9
Proof. Let Uu (s/(1 s))(p2/p1)[1 2(1 a)s] (1 s)(1 2a) 2sa. The proof fol-
lows from BU/(B(p2/p1))>0 and BU/Ba>0 if the conditions in Remarks 1 and 2 are
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BU=Bs > 0ð< 0Þ for s < ð>Þ su1
ð1 2aÞ p2
p1
1þ 2 p2
p1
 2a 2þ p2
p1
 
vuuuuut
where sa(0,1). 5
Let us first consider a. Since there are less rents destroyed by competition if a increases,
labor mobility is less of a threat to industry profits, and technology spillovers arise for a
larger region of parameters, as Fig. 2 shows. Soft competition in the product market
favors, therefore, technology spillovers. In a recent study on the adoption of manufacturing
technologies by 1902 Canadian plants, Joung Yeo (2002) finds evidence in this direction
by showing that technology spillovers are more likely when firms do not operate in the
same product market.
Let us now consider s. Remember that technology spillovers have two opposing effects:
increased competition and a higher overall probability to develop innovation 2. s is
important for both these effects, and we consider them in turn. First, starting from an
asymmetric situation in the second period notice that when s approaches either 0 or 1, firms
are very likely to end up competing on equal footing if technology spillovers take place, but
very unlikely to be competing otherwise. Since competition destroys profits, this works
against labor mobility. Hence, the parameter space under which technology spillovers take
place expands for intermediate values of s. Second, and more important, technology
spillovers increase the overall probability to develop innovation 2 by s(1 s). Such
marginal increment is maximized for s = 0.5 and tends to 0 as s approaches either 0 or 1.Fig. 2. The technology spillover condition as a function of s and a (p2/p1 2). The line indicates values of s and a
such that Eq. (3) holds with equality. Above the line, vA < vB and technology spillovers occur. Below the line,
vAzvB and firm A keeps the worker in equilibrium.
10
Again, the effect of a change in s is non-monotonous, with the parameter space for which
technology spillovers take place being the largest for intermediate values of s. Fig. 2
illustrates this point.
Fig. 3. The technology spillover condition for different values of p2/p1.
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increase in p2/p1 implies that it is more important in terms of expected industry profits that
the second innovation is developed. This expands the region of parameters for which
technology spillovers arise. Interesting enough, technology spillovers may occur even if
competition among firms is extremely intense. Fig. 3 illustrates how technology spillovers
may arise for a = 0 if p2/p1 is sufficiently high and s < 1/2. This is worthwhile noting because
previous theoretical analyses have found that the innovator retains the worker and
technology spillovers do not take place if competition destroys industry profits (i.e.,
a < 0.5); see, for instance, Pakes and Nitzan (1983) and Fosfuri et al. (2001). What drives
the difference between our results and the previous literature is the assumption of cumulative
innovation. Indeed, if innovation is not cumulative, the only effect generated by technology
spillovers is increased competition. This always reduces industry profits if a< 0.5.
This last finding is empirically important too, as it suggests that we are more likely to
observe technology spillovers when later innovations have a much larger value than earlier
ones. The prospect of future profits then outweighs the importance of actual profits. High-
tech industries (telecommunications, semiconductors, software, biotechnology) that are
typically associated with high rates of skilled labor mobility, seem to constitute an ideal test
bed for our model. A somewhat different interpretation of this result is that we are more
likely to observe technology spillovers when innovation 1 is based on basic knowledge
with little commercial value, whereas innovation 2 is an application with a much larger
market and value.13 Zucker and Darby (1996) and Zucker et al. (1998) document the
importance of technology spillovers through the mobility of star scientists (i.e., highly
productive individuals who discovered a major breakthrough) in the US biotechnology
industry. Biotechnology is an industry par excellence where basic research plays a crucial
13 For instance, innovation 1 could be a research tool, which enables the development of innovation 2, but
has no direct commercial value (p1 0).11
role. Similarly, Almeida and Kogut (1999) show that the localization of knowledge and the
mobility of engineers are critical factors in semiconductors, another industry where basic
A. Fosfuri, T. Rønde / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 22 (2004) 45 65 57research is important (for instance, advances in materials sciences are crucial in the search
for new materials).
At this stage, we are now able to compute the expected profits of the firms when they
decide to cluster. The expected profits depend on the result of the hiring process. Hence,
we have
Y
clust
¼
s2ðap1þV11Þþ sð1 sÞðp1þ2V11 wsÞþð1 sÞ2V00 if 2V11zV10þV01;
s2ðap1þV11Þ þ sð1 sÞðp1þV10 þ V01  wnsÞ þ ð1 sÞ2V00 otherwise;
8<
:
ð5Þ
where ws =V10V11D and wns =V11V01D.
We can now analyze the initial location choice of the firms.
Proposition 1. Firms choose to locate in the same region if and only if
2V11  V10  V01 > ws ¼ V10  V11  D: ð6Þ
Proof. It follows directly from comparing Eqs. (2) and (5). 5
First notice that the condition for firms to cluster is more stringent than the one driving
technology spillovers. Technology spillovers are the only reason to cluster in our model.
Therefore, firms would not cluster if technology spillovers could not arise, as a joint
location would increase the expected wage of the workers and bring no benefits.14
Suppose now that Eq. (3) is satisfied, so technology spillovers can arise when firms
cluster. The choice to cluster can be seen as an ex ante agreement to share the knowledge of
the first innovation in states where only one firm is successful. Ex post, technology
spillovers reduce the profits of the successful firm and increase the profits of the
unsuccessful one. However, as Eq. (3) holds, the successful firm loses less than the
unsuccessful firm gains, so technology spillovers increase expected joint profits (gross of
wages). It follows that technology spillovers also increase ex ante expected profits, since
firms are equally likely to end up as the successful or the unsuccessful firm. The cost
associated with technology spillovers is the higher expected wage earned by the workers
due to the competition in the labor market. Condition (6) thus simply states that firms
cluster if and only if the benefits from technology spillovers (the left-hand side of condition
(6)) are greater than the additional wage bill (the right hand side of condition (6)).
Proposition 1 shows that stronger trade secret protection, higher D, induces firms to
cluster in a larger region of the parameter space because the rents captured by the workers
are reduced. Stronger trade secret protection is therefore welfare improving because when
technology spillovers arise in equilibrium, they increase both industry profits, expected
wages of the workers, and competition in the product market.
14 Of course, the firms may cluster for reasons that are not captured in our model; see the discussion in the
Introduction.12
Corollary 1. An increase in the strength of trade secret protection does not prevent
technology spillovers, enlarges the parameter space under which clustering takes place,
and is always (weakly) welfare improving.
Fig. 4. The equilibrium location of the firms (p2/p1 3; D 0). Above the solid line, the firms cluster, and below,
they locate separately. The dashed line indicates the technology spillover condition.
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improving once firms’ R&D choices are endogenized, see Section 4.1. Second, if trade
secret protection is so strong that it exceeds the value of the worker for the hiring firm,
technology spillovers would never occur unless firms privately agree on establishing a
reduced level of damage compensation. Presumably, such negotiations are difficult, and
firms may not always be able to reach the joint profit maximizing outcome. Thus, very
strong trade secret protection may actually be worse than no protection, as it can prevent
technology spillovers from arising in situations where all parties involved would benefit
from them.
Condition (6), as a function of our exogenous parameters, a, s, and (p2/p1), is illustrated
in Fig. 4. Similarly to condition (3), condition (6) is more likely to be satisfied for high
values of p2/p1 and a and for intermediate values of s. This suggests that local industrial
districts with high levels of labor turnover, like Silicon Valley, are associated with industries
(biotechnology, semiconductors) where the prospect of future profits outweighs the
importance of actual profits. It is less likely that we observe clustering and high labor
mobility in industries with low growth potential. Finally, firms in clustered industries
should, ceteris paribus, pay higher wages for the same job. Our model would thus predict a
positive correlation between the growth potential of the industry, the geographic concen-
tration of R&D activities, job mobility, and skilled labor wages.
4. Extensions
We consider different extensions of the basic model presented in Section 3. To save
space, all proofs have been left out but are available upon request.13
4.1. Endogenous R&D
A. Fosfuri, T. Rønde / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 22 (2004) 45 65 59So far, we have not analyzed R&D decisions explicitly, but have simply assumed that
firms are blessed with an exogenous probability to innovate. Here, we discuss how our
results change once R&D is endogenized. Successful R&D will usually be the result of an
investment by the firm and efforts by the workers. For clarity, we consider two polar cases:
One where only the firm’s investment matters, and another where it is the worker’s effort
that is crucial. The algebra of the former case can be found in our working paper (Fosfuri
and Rønde, 2003).
4.1.1. R&D investment by the firm
We consider a setup where in each period firms choose their own probability to develop
an innovation (i.e., their R&D intensity). The R&D decision is taken after a worker has
been hired. The game remains otherwise unchanged with respect to our basic model in
Section 3. We assume that the cost of R&D is quadratic. If firm za{A,B} chooses a
probability sz to innovate, it must incur a cost c(sz)
2/2. The parameter c controls for how
costly the R&D activity is.
Solving backwards, the first step is to compute the equilibrium R&D intensities in the
second period given the knowledge available to the firms. Then, one can derive the
corresponding second-period equilibrium profits, Vij. As in the basic model, technology
spillovers arise if and only if V10 +V01>2V11. A closer inspection of this condition shows that
the parameter space under which technology spillovers arise expands, roughly speaking, for
larger values of a and (p2/p1). The parameter c plays a role similar to our exogenous s in
Section 3. One can show that the endogenous R&D intensities are inversely related to c.
Technology spillovers occur, as the previous analysis would suggest, for intermediate values
of c where the equilibrium R&D intensities also are intermediate. No technology spillovers
occur for low (high) values of c where R&D intensities are high (low).
Moving upwards in the game tree, one can solve for the equilibrium R&D intensities in
the first period. These intensities depend on the location decision and on whether technology
spillovers can arise in the second period. When firms cluster in the first period, R&D
intensities can be shown to be increasing with the strength of trade secret protection. Unlike
in the basic model, trade secret laws play the important role of stimulating investment in
R&D. Still, one can show that as long as trade secret protection is not excessive (i.e., the
equivalent of assumption A.1 holds), first-period R&D intensities are the highest when firms
separate. The reason is that technology spillovers generate a free-riding problem: A firm that
was unsuccessful in the first period can (sometimes) hire the rival’s worker and acquire the
knowledge of innovation 1 in the second period. The possibility of free riding on the rival’s
investment reduces firms’ incentives to invest in R&D in the first period.15
As a last step, one needs to compare the two-period expected profits under clustering and
under separation. Again, it turns out that technology spillovers are a necessary but not
sufficient condition for clustering and that the conditions favoring technology spillovers
also lead to more clustering (high values of a and (p2/p1) and intermediate values of c).
Overall, endogenizing the R&D investment does not invalidate the comparative statics
15 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to us this possibility.
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obtained in Section 3. However, our finding that clustering was always welfare improving
is not any longer so clear-cut, because first-period R&D intensities are lower under
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and the mode of competition, we cannot undertake a full welfare analysis. It might well be
that clustering is still welfare enhancing for all acceptable parameter values, but we cannot
be sure of this.16 This points out that whereas most of our findings are pretty robust, our
conclusion about welfare should be taken with caution.
4.1.2. R&D investment by the workers
The efforts of key researchers are often crucial for R&D success, and it is in the interest of
a firm to provide its researchers with high-powered incentive schemes. Although objective
measures of R&D success, such as patents, publications, and profits, are sometimes
available, in most cases, it is difficult to write employment contracts that are contingent
on R&D outcomes. A firm can promise to reward a successful researcher, but such a promise
is usually not legally binding. The firm faces then a commitment problem: Ex ante, it is
optimal to promise to reward a successful researcher to provide incentives. Ex post, once the
innovation has been made, it is tempting for the firm to renege on this promise.
One of the results in Section 3 is that when firms choose to cluster, workers who
possess the knowledge of innovation 1 command a higher expected wage in period 2.
Hence, locating in a high-tech cluster could serve as a commitment to reward successful
workers and might result in higher R&D efforts in the first period compared to
separation.17 In a related work, Motta and Rønde (2002) develop this idea in the context
of covenants not to compete. They show that it can be optimal not to include a covenant
not to compete in the employment contract to let a successful worker receive outside
offers and alleviate the commitment problem described above. Contrary to our previous
analysis, this also suggests that when the R&D efforts of the workers play a crucial role,
stronger trade secret protection might result in a lower level of innovation activity,
because wages are reduced.
4.2. No wealth and credit constraints
The workers earn an expected wage above 0 (the reservation wage) in the second period
when firms cluster. The workers would therefore be willing to accept a negative first-period
wage as long as they could survive the first period by consuming initial wealth or borrowing
on the capital markets. Of course, the expected wage over the two periods must be
nonnegative. Suppose that the workers have access to an initial wealth or credit of w0>0.
Assuming that the total amount of money available for consumption each period should be
16 In fact, without specifying these details we do not even know whether firms over or underinvest in R&D
compared to the first-best, since firms’ R&D decisions generate two externalities going in opposite directions.
First, firms do not take into account the effect of their own R&D investment on their competitor’s profits. Second,
firms ignore the part of the value created by the innovation that accrues to consumers. The first externality pushes
towards overinvestment in R&D and the second towards underinvestment.
17 In our two-period setup, clustering would have no effect on efforts in the second period, because firms
only compete for the workers once. Motta and Rønde (2002) study an infinite horizon setup where reputation
concerns sometimes solve the commitment problem.
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nonnegative, the first-period wage cannot be lower than w0. Solving the game as before,
we obtain the following proposition:
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A. Fosfuri, T. Rønde / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 22 (2004) 45 65 61roposition 2 . Suppose that 2V11>V10 +V01, so technology spillovers can arise when
ms choose a joint location. For w0 < s(1 s)(V10V11D), the firms cluster if and
ly if
sð1 sÞ½2V11  ðV10 þ V01Þ  ðV10  V11  DÞ þ w0z0: ð7Þ
or w0z s(1 s)(V10V11D), the workers earn no expected rents, and the firms always
uster. If 2V11 <V10 +V01, the firms always (weakly) prefer to locate in separate regions.
We see by comparing Eqs. (6) and (7) that the firms cluster for a larger region of the
rameter space when the wealth constraint is relaxed. The negative first-period wage
lows the firms to extract (some of) the rents earned by the workers, which makes it more
tractive to choose a joint location.18
.3. Finite relocation costs for workers
In Section 3, we have assumed that it is prohibitively expensive to hire a worker
ployed in a different region. Now, we allow for lower levels of relocation costs. Suppose
at firm i has to pay a fixed cost k>0 when poaching the worker from firm j located in a
fferent region. Here, there are different cases to consider. First, if 2V11VV10 +V01,
chnology spillovers do not arise independently of k and firms’ locations. The firms thus
parate, because the relocation costs reduce the wage of the workers. Second, if
11>V10 +V01 + k, technology spillovers arise both under clustering and separation. It is
timal to cluster to avoid paying the relocation costs. Finally, the most interesting case
ppens when V10 +V01 < 2V11VV10 +V01 + k. Here, technology spillovers arise only if
rms cluster. We need to distinguish between two subcases. If k>V11V01D, the lagging
rm is not interested in hiring a worker from a firm located in another region. Thus, the
alysis developed in Section 3 remains unchanged. On the other hand, if k<V11V01D,
e lagging firm is willing to pay up to V11V01D k>0 to attract the worker. The model
n then be solved as in Section 3. We obtain that firms cluster if and only if
2V11  ðV10 þ V01Þz fV10  V11  D
wage clustering ðwsÞ
fMaxf0;V11  V01  D kg
wage separation ðwnsÞ
Z
2V11  ðV10 þ V01Þz k
2
if k < V11  V01  D;
2V11  ðV10 þ V01ÞzV10  V11  D otherwise:
Notice that for low levels of relocation costs, the protection provided by separate
cations is stronger the greater is k. Therefore, the profits under separation are increasing in
18 This leads to the empirical prediction that workers in a high-tech cluster will have a steeper earnings
ofile over time than workers outside a cluster.16
k, which in turn makes clustering less attractive. For high relocation costs, we find again
condition (6). Removing the assumption of prohibitively high relocation costs changes the
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4.4. The knowledge is embedded in the worker
We now allow for the possibility that the innovating firm experiences a loss of
knowledge when the worker moves to a rival. For example, this could be because the
employee ‘hides’ some of the relevant knowledge, or because some of the knowledge is
tacit and difficult to articulate. Such a loss of knowledge translates into a lower
probability to develop innovation 2. To capture this possibility, we assume that if the
worker leaves, the probability to develop innovation 2 is ls with lV 1. The formal
analysis remains basically unchanged with respect to Section 3. Suppose that only firm
A develops innovation 1. The expected profits of firm A if it loses the worker are now
V11
A(l) = ls2ap2 + ls(1 s)p2+(1 s)(1 ls)ap1 +D. Similarly, the expected profits of
firm B if it hires the worker are V11
B(l) = ls2ap2 + s(1 ls)p2+(1 s)(1 ls)ap1D.
Following the analysis in Section 3, it is easy to show that technology spillovers only
occur if V11
A(l) +V11
B(l)>V10 +V01, where V10 and V01 are given by Eq. (1). Notice that
only the left-hand side of the inequality depends on l. One can show that the derivative
of the left-hand side of the inequality with respect to l is always positive. This implies
that the larger is l, the larger is the parameter space for which technology spillovers take
place. Firms cluster if and only if V11
A(l) +V11
B(l) (V10 +V01)>V10V11A(l)D, and
this inequality is laxer for higher values of l. In other words, when the movement of the
worker implies a loss of knowledge for the innovating firm, it is less likely that we
observe clustering and technology spillovers. In the limit for l = 0, one can show that
technology spillovers never take place. As a result, firms do not cluster. Here, the
worker’s mobility would simply shift R&D capabilities from firm A to firm B without
increasing the overall probability to develop innovation 2. Furthermore, some profits
would be dissipated because both firms would have innovation 1 and compete in the
product market. In sum, our results derived in Section 3 rely on knowledge being a
public good within the innovating firm.
4.5. Injunctive relief and covenant not to compete
Suing for damages is not the only means available to a firm for protecting its trade
secrets against misappropriation. For instance, it can seek an injunctive relief when the
worker leaves or can include a covenant not to compete in the labor contract. We can
model these two options in a similar way by assuming that if an employee with valuable
knowledge is hired by a rival firm, there is a probability p that a court will prevent him
from working for his new employer. p is either the probability that the court grants
injunctive relief or enforces a covenant not to compete. We assume that the new
employer has to pay the wage offered no matter the outcome of a trial. In addition, let
D = 0.
Suppose that firm A has developed the first innovation, but firm B has not. The firms’
valuations of the worker are modified as follows: vAV=(1 p)(V10V11) and
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vBV=(1 p)(V11V01), because firm B can only exploit the knowledge with probability
1 p. From vAVz ( < )vBV, it follows that labor turnover takes place exactly for the same
A. Fosfuri, T. Rønde / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 22 (2004) 45 65 63parameter space that we derived in Section 3. However, when labor turnover occurs,
technology spillovers arise only with probability (1 p). Solving the model as before, we
obtain that firms cluster if and only if 2V11V10V01zV10V11. The strength of trade
secret protection does not affect firms’ ex ante incentives to cluster, because trade secret
protection has two effects that cancel exactly out. On the one hand, stronger trade secret
protection reduces the wage that workers receive, which, in turn, reduces the costs of
clustering. On the other, there are fewer technology spillovers, which reduce the benefits
of clustering.
Proposition 3. Post employment covenants not to compete and the possibility to seek an
injunctive relief reduce the amount of technology spillovers that arise in a cluster and do
not affect firms’ incentives to cluster.
A system of trade secret protection based on covenants not to compete or the possibility
to seek an injunctive relief behave quite differently from one based on punitive damages.
Indeed, stronger protection does not affect clustering. Instead, it prevents technology
spillovers from arising when firms locate in the same region. In this sense, our model
provides some support to Gilson’s (1999) claim that the lack of enforceable covenants not
to compete has spurred labor mobility and innovation in Silicon Valley.
5. ConclusionMotivated by the recent debate about the reasons underpinning the success of Silicon
Valley, we have studied firms’ incentives to cluster in order to benefit from reciprocaltechnology spillovers. Generally speaking, we find that the story of Silicon Valley, as told
by economic geographers and other scholars, is consistent from an economic point of
view. Our formal model, however, allows us to pin down the crucial assumptions behind
the argument. We find that firms’ incentives to cluster are the strongest when the following
three conditions are met: (1) the value of later innovations is high relative to earlier ones;
(2) competition in the product market is relatively soft; (3) the probability of a single firm
to develop an innovation is neither very high nor very low. Especially, the first condition is
important for empirical research. It suggests that clustering and technology spillovers are
more likely to be observed in industries with high growth potential. Hence, a standard
OLS regression aimed at quantifying the benefits of clustering and technology spillovers
on firms’ profitability might produce biased estimates, if it does not control for this
characteristic. This finding also warns policy makers against the attempt of trying to
‘‘clone’’ the success of Silicon Valley in industries that have structurally much smaller
growth potential.
In addition, our model predicts that in industries where clustering is driven by
technology spillovers, labor turnover is high and skilled workers receive, ceteris paribus,
higher wages. These findings seem to fit well with the stories of industries such as
semiconductors and biotechnology (Zucker and Darby, 1996; Almeida and Kogut,
1999).
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Interesting enough, our model also suggests that weak trade secret protection might not
be a prerequisite for clustering and labor mobility as some legal scholars have recently
A. Fosfuri, T. Rønde / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 22 (2004) 45 6564argued. Indeed, we show that a system of trade secret protection based on punitive damages,
except in some extreme cases, is beneficial for firms’ profits, stimulates clustering, and is
not an impediment to workers’ mobility. However, trade secret protection that prevents
technology spillovers from arising (post-employment covenants not to compete, injunctive
relief, or excessive damages) does not affect clustering. Instead, profits are reduced
because, although firms have clustered, technology spillovers do not materialize.
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